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In times of national crisis, the government often endows itself with 
broad and unprecedented powers.1 Following the events on September 11, 
2001, the United States government enhanced the scope of its surveillance 
capabilities in the name of preventing terrorist activity; privacy was sec-
ond to alleged safety as Congress reacted rashly to pass legislation.2 As 
the United States responds to the global crisis of COVID-19, surveillance 
 
 †  Emma Mendelson is a part-time 3L at CUNY School of Law. 
 1 See, e.g., Alex Joel, 9/11 All Over Again, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/7YUL-X88P; Emergency Banking Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1, 48 Stat. 1 
(1933); War Powers Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, 55 Stat. 838. 
 2 Peter Swire, Security, Privacy and the Coronavirus: Lessons from 9/11, LAWFARE 
(Mar. 24, 2020, 2:46 PM), https://perma.cc/93RB-LWTP. 
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has returned as an integral tool for national security: Both local and fed-
eral governments are using location metadata and health data to assist in 
preventing the disease’s spread.3 
“Contact [or proximity] tracing—which involves figuring out who 
an infected person has been in contact with and trying to prevent them 
from infecting others—is one of the most promising solutions” for moni-
toring COVID-19 and has manifested through government contracts with 
private technology providers like Google and Apple.4 These private, 
third-party corporations collect not only content-based data (e.g., e-mails 
and direct messages) from their users, but also metadata, such as user lo-
cation, which is continuously and passively uploaded into each of the 
companies’ servers.5 While content-based data have been given certain 
legal protections,6 the government’s acquisition of metadata from private, 
third parties is still open to interpretation.7 
During the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a 
key shift in the “expected” surveilled population8 from the post-9/11 era. 
 
 3 CDC COVID-19 Surveillance, Subheading of FAQ: COVID-19 Data and Surveillance, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/L5YC-N3P8 (last updated Nov. 
20, 2020); COVIDView Weekly Summary, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://perma.cc/E74F-WHBF (last updated Sept. 28, 2020); Benjamin Lesser et al., Special 
Report: Local Governments ‘Overwhelmed’ in Race to Trace U.S. COVID Contacts, REUTERS 
(Aug. 4, 2020, 7:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-tracing-spe-
cialrep/special-report-local-governments-overwhelmed-in-race-to-trace-u-s-covid-contacts-
idUSKCN2501GK. 
 4 Russell Brandom & Adi Robertson, Apple and Google Are Building a Coronavirus 
Tracking System into iOS and Android, VERGE (Apr. 10, 2020, 12:58 PM), https://www.thev-
erge.com/2020/4/10/21216484/google-apple-coronavirus-contract-tracing-bluetooth-loca-
tion-tracking-data-app. 
 5 During oral argument for Carpenter v. United States, Supreme Court Justice Sonia So-
tomayor commented on the dangers of unprotected metadata collection. When a cell phone 
becomes “an appendage” for the individual (e.g., where people sleep with the phone in their 
bed), the collection of contentless metadata in the aggregate, which includes location data, 
reveals a substantial amount of information, comparable to the collection of content data. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-43, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 
16-402); see also Amy Davidson Sorkin, In Carpenter Case, Justice Sotomayor Tries to Pic-
ture the Smartphone Future, NEW YORKER (Nov. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/RQ6P-PDHR. 
 6 The Stored Communications Act (SCA) was enacted as part of the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701-13 (2018). By passing the ECPA, Congress closed the gaps in privacy protec-
tion for wire and electronic communications and transactional records because the Fourth 
Amendment’s right to be “secure in [one’s] persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures,” did not include electronic communications. U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
 7 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210-11 (holding a warrant is required when police seek 
cell phone tower data in connection with alleged criminal activity from a third-party). 
 8 “Expected” in this context means the population that was intended to be surveilled ver-
sus the one actually surveilled. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act was meant to “deter and 
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Rather than surveillance policy that is outwardly aimed at allegedly sus-
pect populations (e.g., terrorists9 or those affiliated with such), it can now 
include all U.S. citizens at home or abroad, non-citizens in the country, 
and others trying to enter the country. The current volume of users pre-
sents an unprecedented surveillance landscape. As of August 10, 2020, 
Facebook had over 2.7 billion monthly active users.10 As of April 30, 
2020, Google Chrome, a cross-platform web browser that saves every-
thing a user does (e.g., search history, email content, location) to their 
Google account, had over two billion users.11 The prevalence of third-
party data platforms without any meaningful change in third-party data 
laws has caused significant violations of individuals’ right to privacy—
and will continue to do so.12 
 
punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world” by intercepting communica-
tions from “non-United States persons.” Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act 
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, pmbl., § 207, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT 
Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see also Glenn Greenwald & James 
Ball, The Top Secret Rules that Allow NSA to Use US Data Without a Warrant, GUARDIAN 
(June 20, 2013, 6:59 PM), https://perma.cc/BA8A-9SSC. In practice, the USA PATRIOT Act 
was used to collect massive amounts of domestic communications from people with no con-
nections to terrorist acts or groups. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program 
Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM), 
https://perma.cc/SK93-NT6R. 
 9 The author uses this term because it is the language of the post-9/11 surveillance laws 
being discussed. This language has enabled significant anti-Muslim hatred, is used to dehu-
manize individuals in the name of national security, and will only be used in this Note as 
necessary. 
 10 J. Clement, Facebook: Number of Monthly Active Users Worldwide 2008-2020, 
STATISTA (Nov. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/7UKQ-S4EH; see also Briana M. Trifiro & Jen-
nifer Gerson, Social Media Usage Patterns: Research Note Regarding the Lack of Universal 
Validated Measures for Active and Passive Use, SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, Apr.-June 2019, at 1-
2, https://perma.cc/9YWZ-K6ZT (“[A]ctive social media usage refers to online behaviors that 
facilitate ‘direct exchanges’ among users . . . . Active social use represents direct written com-
munication between the user and their friends . . . .”). 
 11 Gordon Kelly, Google Chrome Crash Reports Grow with New Error Reports, FORBES 
(last updated Apr. 30, 2020, 7:27 AM), https://perma.cc/XMN6-YDEU (stating a Chrome 
software update was distributed on or around April 29, 2020, “to the browser’s two billion 
users worldwide.”). 
 12 Since its passage in 1986, ECPA has not been amended to account for technological 
advances. Modernizing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), ACLU, 
https://perma.cc/W87X-YHN4 (“Since 1986, technology has advanced at breakneck speed 
while electronic privacy law remained at a standstill.”). Meanwhile, the SCA, Title II of the 
ECPA, was minimally amended in 2018 to incorporate modern technology, with the Clarify-
ing Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data 
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, div. V, §§ 101-06, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). The CLOUD Act allowed 
federal law enforcement to compel U.S.-based tech companies to turn over data, regardless of 
whether the data was stored domestically or abroad. Michael E. Lackey & Oral D. Pottinger, 
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Applying the lessons learned from post-9/11 surveillance laws and 
programs that created blanket searches of domestic communications in 
the name of national security13 could be valuable as the United States 
traverses this thicketed terrain. This Note will identify key takeaways 
from the post-9/11 era and use them to contextualize surveillance prac-
tices during the COVID-19 pandemic. Part I discusses the post-9/11 leg-
islation that broadened the government’s surveillance powers. Part II ex-
amines how the Trump administration responded to the COVID-19 
outbreak. Both Parts I and II consider the types of data being sought and 
the government agencies involved, along with the data collection methods 
employed. Finally, Part III suggests some protective courses of action by 
considering the fallout from the post-9/11 era of surveillance and its 
abuses of individual privacy rights. While data surveillance will be an 
integral tool in slowing the spread of COVID-19, the post-9/11 era has 
shown the kinds of egregious personal violations that occur when govern-
ment surveillance programs are allowed to act in secrecy and given unfet-
tered deference.14 
I.  THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE BROADENED SCOPE OF 
SURVEILLANCE 
A. The Law and the NSA 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)15 is a good 
jumping-off point for a conversation about modern surveillance pro-
grams. FISA is an invention of the Cold War era and a response to exten-
sive government surveillance that had been growing since the early 20th 
century, as new technologies created public insecurity over the govern-
ment’s reach into individuals’ lives.16 The Act provided the acceptable 
 
Stored Communications Act: Practical Considerations, LEXISNEXIS (June 22, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/9EKG-WX9Z. 
 13 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 
92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA 
FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268; USA PATRIOT Act. 
 14 Joseph Zeballos-Roig, 7 Ways that 9/11 Created a Dystopian Security Landscape that 
Americans Are Still Living in, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2019, 2:34 PM), https://perma.cc/4QM 
H-9KXY. 
 15 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 16 For decades following World War II, “as part of its SHAMROCK [and MINARET] 
Program[s], the government collected and turned over to the NSA millions of telegrams that 
originated within, terminated in, or traveled through the United States.” G. Alex Sinha, NSA 
Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy, 59 LOY. L. REV. 861, 869 (2003). 
This coincided with the Red Scare—“paranoia about the internal Communist threat”—follow-
ing World War II because of fears over the Soviet Union’s occupation of Eastern Europe. 
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means for physical and electronic surveillance (e.g., wiretapping, access 
to business records, pen registers), along with judicial and congressional 
oversight of intelligence agencies.17 
But these regulations were loose. For instance, while judicial author-
ization was required to spy on non-U.S. persons for more than three days, 
spying could begin 72 hours before authorization was given.18 Moreover, 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the court created un-
der FISA, has a reputation of deferring to the National Security Agency’s 
(NSA) judgment without much scrutiny.19 The court was also designed to 
maintain secrecy for the sake of national security, offering little in the way 
of accountability.20 FISC has no obligation to reveal court documents or 
decisions about the warrants it approves.21 
Initially, counter-terrorist initiatives following 9/11 were bipartisan, 
helping legislation move quickly.22 Much of that support resulted from 
the Bush administration harassing Congress with threats of potential fu-
ture attacks.23 Attorney General John Ashcroft’s office began drafting 
legislation to provide “access to [previously unavailable] legal tools in 
order to more effectively combat terrorism.”24 These efforts culminated 
 
McCarthyism and the Red Scare, U. VA. MILLER CTR., https://perma.cc/H9HP-EFVK (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2020). Domestic espionage projects like MINARET and SHAMROCK were 
driven by anti-communist sentiment from the White House and aimed at prominent figures, 
such as Muhammad Ali and Martin Luther King, Jr., who were protesting the Vietnam War. 
Matthew M. Aid & William Burr, Secret Cold War Documents Reveal NSA Spied on Senators, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 25, 2013, 8:30 PM), https://perma.cc/H6MY-WG9X. 
 17 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 §§ 102-03, 108. 
 18 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(1) (2020). 
 19 Between 1979 and 2012, “the court overseeing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act has rejected only 11 of the more than 33,900 surveillance applications by the government, 
according to annual Justice Department reports to Congress.” Evan Perez, Secret Court’s 
Oversight Gets Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2013, 7:11 PM), https://perma.cc/48AH-NZQD. 
 20 5-4: Clapper v. Amnesty International, WESTWOOD ONE PODCAST NETWORK (May 12, 
2020) (downloaded using Stitcher). 
 21 Id. 
 22 The 9/11 Commission was a bipartisan collection of lawmakers who probed into 9/11, 
identified what kinds of “mistakes could be prevented in the future,” and created the 9/11 
Commission Report. Sam Brodey, A Bipartisan Commission Came Together After 9/11. Don’t 
Count on It for COVID-19., DAILY BEAST (Apr. 8, 2020, 6:56 AM), https://perma.cc/2D99-
2BMK; see also Dara Lind, Everyone’s Heard of the Patriot Act. Here’s What It Actually 
Does., VOX (June 2, 2015, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/6/2/8701499/patriot-act-ex-
plain; Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. 
REV. 951, 951-52 (2006). 
 23 See generally Surveillance Under the USA/Patriot Act, ACLU, https://perma.cc/FRH9-
XKDN (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). 
 24 Joshua H. Pike, The Impact of a Knee-Jerk Reaction: The Patriot Act Amendments to 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Ability of One Word to Erase Established 
Constitutional Requirements, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 185, 211 (2007) (citing JOHN ASHCROFT, 
NEVER AGAIN: SECURING AMERICA AND RESTORING JUSTICE 154 (2006)). “[S]uch legal tools 
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in the USA PATRIOT Act, signed into law by George W. Bush on Octo-
ber 26, 2001, about a month and a half after 9/11.25 Since its enactment, 
not only has the USA PATRIOT Act become synonymous with broad 
governmental powers of surveillance, it also expanded other executive 
powers, like detention powers and the authority to generate funding for 
counter-terrorism.26 Some key, surveillance-specific provisions of the 
USA PATRIOT Act are27: section 215 (third-party records searches);28 
section 213 (private property searches without owner’s notice);29 section 
218 (expanding the Fourth Amendment’s exception to collection of for-
eign intelligence information);30 section 214 (surveilling “foreign intelli-
gence information not concerning a United States person”);31 and the Na-
tional Security Letters Provision (“expand[ing] the FBI’s authority to 
demand personal customer records from Internet Service Providers . . . 
without prior court approval”).32 Section 215—along with the rarely-used 
sections 20633 and 20734—were temporary provisions that were set to (and 
did) sunset in 2015.35 
FISA was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act under Title II, Sec-
tion 218.36 Originally, FISA contained an exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s probable cause requirement: Wiretapping or general searches 
 
included amending the legal standard for acquiring a FISA order and the degree of permissible 
communications between criminal prosecutors and foreign intelligence agents.” Id. at 210 
n.126 (citing ASHCROFT, supra, at 156). 
 25 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 26 See Lind, supra note 22. 
 27 For summaries of the following sections, see Surveillance Under the USA/Patriot Act, 
supra note 23. 
 28 USA PATRIOT Act § 215. Section 215 sunsetted on March 15, 2020. India McKinney, 
Section 215 Expired: Year in Review 2020, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 29, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/ZYE2-YYCH. 
 29 USA PATRIOT Act § 213. 
 30 Id. § 218. 
 31 Id. § 214. 
 32 National Security Letters, ACLU, https://perma.cc/U96D-FL36 (last visited Dec. 29, 
2020). 
 33 The “roving wiretap” provision is where a wiretap follows an individual. See USA 
PATRIOT Act § 206. 
 34 The “lone wolf” provision is where the government has “probable cause” to surveil a 
target but cannot show the target’s link to a foreign terrorist organization or foreign power. 
USA PATRIOT Act § 207; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(C); Robert Chesney, Why Is the 
Lone Wolf FISA Provision Never Used? And Just How Broad Is the FISC Understanding of 
Group Agency?, LAWFARE (June 3, 2015, 2:13 PM), https://perma.cc/BKA9-PKPY. 
 35 Lind, supra note 22; McKinney, supra note 28. 
 36 USA PATRIOT Act § 218. 
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could occur “only if the primary purpose was to gather foreign intelli-
gence.”37 Section 218 changed the “primary purpose” requirement of for-
eign intelligence-gathering to a “significant purpose” requirement, loos-
ening the evidentiary standard.38 Changing to the “significant purpose” 
standard allowed the government to “circumvent the traditional warrant 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment,”39 even if the primary purpose 
was to gather criminal evidence.40 
Before FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act, the NSA, a government 
intelligence agency, engaged in domestic surveillance for decades.41 The 
NSA had projects like SHAMROCK that intercepted telegraphic data 
(e.g., telegrams) entering and exiting the United States.42 Its sister project, 
MINARET, involved intercepting domestic electronic communications 
and transmitting them to other federal intelligence agencies, like the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA).43 ThinThread, designed by William Binney, Ed Loomis, and J. 
Kirk Wiebe,44 was a program from the 1990s that enhanced wiretapping 
by providing the architecture to analyze the vast amount of data the NSA 
was collecting and then dump irrelevant data to comply with Fourth 
Amendment warrantless search and seizure rights.45 Three weeks prior to 
9/11, ThinThread was sidelined by Trailblazer, an essentially identical, 
 
 37 Surveillance Under the USA/Patriot Act, supra note 23 (emphasis added). 
 38 Pike, supra note 24 (“Section 218 . . . amended 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) of FISA to 
require the significant purpose of a FISA order be for foreign intelligence, rather than the 
previously required primary purpose or purpose requirement.”); Jennifer L. Sullivan, From 
the Purpose to a Significant Purpose: Assessing the Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act Under the Fourth Amendment, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 379, 381 (2005) (“While authorization for a FISA court order traditionally entailed 
certification that ‘the purpose’ of the surveillance was to acquire foreign intelligence, section 
218 allows the FISA court to issue a FISA warrant if ‘a significant purpose’ of the investiga-
tion is foreign intelligence surveillance.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 39 Sullivan, supra note 38, at 412. 
 40 Pike, supra note 24. 
 41 NSA Timeline 1791-2015, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/QKS8-548G. 
 42 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 765 (1976). 
 43 See Lisa Graves, The Right to Privacy in Light of Presidents’ Programs: What Project 
MINARET’s Admissions Reveal About Modern Surveillance of Americans, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
1855, 1879-80 (2010). 
 44 ThinThread Whistleblowers, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (May 7, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/5EQZ-VUKA. 
 45 Patrick G. Eddington, Hayden, NSA, and the Road to 9/11, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 7, 
2017), https://perma.cc/7W6K-8XJ3. 
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though exorbitantly more flawed, project46 that, notably, lacked Fourth 
Amendment protections.47 
After 9/11 and the USA PATRIOT Act’s enactment—and following 
an executive order from George W. Bush48—the NSA implemented the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program, which enabled the comprehensive, war-
rantless seizure of electronic data (e.g., interception of phone conversa-
tions and private e-mails).49 Oversight was more relaxed under the Ter-
rorist Surveillance Program than it had been under FISA. Rather than 
limit surveillance target decision-making to senior staff members, under 
the Terrorist Surveillance Program “targets . . . may be chosen by the ‘op-
erational work force’ at the NSA and approved by a shift supervisor.”50 
And while the Terrorist Surveillance Program ended in 2007, it paved the 
way for other programs like PRISM, OAKSTAR, and STORMBREW, 
which allowed the NSA—so long as it received FISC’s blessing—to con-
duct dragnet searches of data from users of private internet service pro-
viders.51 These programs were created under the Protect America Act of 
 
 46 By the time it was abandoned in 2006, Trailblazer had cost the government $1.2 billion 
and “stalled at the level of schematic drawings . . . .” Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW 
YORKER (May 23, 2011), https://perma.cc/BL3P-ZW63; see also Tim Shorrock, Obama’s 
Crackdown on Whistleblowers, NATION (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/arti-
cle/archive/obamas-crackdown-whistleblowers/; Eddington, supra note 45. 
 47 Rather than segregate, encrypt, and discard unnecessary communications like Thin-
Thread did, Trailblazer “was about ingesting signals, identifying and sorting them, storing 
what was important, and then quickly retrieving data in response to queries.” Eddington, supra 
note 45 (quoting MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, PLAYING TO THE EDGE: AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN 
THE AGE OF TERROR 20 (2017)). This kind of data seizure and storage by the government vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in the 
absence of a warrant and probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 48 Sinha, supra note 16, at 864. 
 49 Id. at 888 (“[T]he NSA had ‘intercepted private e-mail messages and phone calls of 
Americans in recent months on a scale that went beyond the broad legal limits established by 
Congress . . . .’”) (quoting Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Ex-
ceeded Law, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2009)), https://perma.cc/63UY-STSM. Sinha stated they 
used the term “NSA program” in their article to refer to what was publicly known as the “Ter-
rorist Surveillance Program” and, internally at the NSA, as “Operation Stellar Wind.” Id. at 
876 n.79. 
 50 Katherine Wong, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 
519 (2006). 
 51 See Letter from Attorney Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales to Senators Patrick Leahy and Ar-
len Specter (Jan. 17, 2007), https://perma.cc/V8G4-69M6; NSA Timeline 1791-2015, supra 
note 41; T.C. Sottek & Janus Kopfstein, Everything You Need to Know About PRISM, VERGE 
(July 17, 2013, 1:36 PM), https://perma.cc/357Q-YX47; Sam Biddle, The NSA Worked to 
“Track Down” Bitcoin Users, Snowden Documents Reveal, INTERCEPT (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:22 
AM), https://perma.cc/7K5Z-YPW5; Newly Disclosed N.S.A. Files Detail Partnerships with 
AT&T and Verizon, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/ZES4-XB6P. 
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2007,52 which decimated protections for U.S. persons by allowing war-
rantless surveillance of communications, so long as the communication 
was “directed at” someone overseas.53 
A year later, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.54 
Constitutional rights advocates like the ACLU warned that these amend-
ments continued to facilitate data-collection abuses against Americans.55 
The amendments broadened presidential powers by allowing mass spying 
of communications without requiring that targets had connections to ter-
rorist activities or organizations;56 restricted judicial oversight by allow-
ing programs denied by FISC to continue;57 and provided “retroactive im-
munity to the telecommunications companies for their role in the 
president’s domestic spying program.”58 This immediately worried 
groups of lawyers, journalists, and human rights organizations like the 
ACLU and Amnesty International, which were concerned their commu-
nications with persons overseas would be intercepted. These groups 
claimed they would need to take extra precautions to protect their over-
seas communications with those who would be considered suspect under 
these amendments and filed a lawsuit in federal court to enjoin enforce-
ment of the amendments and hold them to be facially unconstitutional.59 
But rather than make a determination on the substance of the FISA 
amendments, the Supreme Court held that Amnesty International did not 
have a sufficient case in controversy for standing because its alleged harm 
was too speculative.60 The dissent, however, considered the alleged 
“speculative” injuries to be injuries in fact.61 
 
 52 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552. 
 53 See Sottek & Kopfstein, supra note 51; ACLU Analysis of the Protect America Act, 
ACLU, https://perma.cc/N2AY-8QBZ (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 
 54 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. 
 55 See Talking Points on the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, ACLU, 
https://perma.cc/E4YF-3Z4E (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2013) (“Respondents also assert that 
they ‘have ceased engaging’ in certain telephone and e-mail conversations. According to re-
spondents, the threat of surveillance will compel them to travel abroad in order to have in-
person conversations. In addition, respondents declare that they have undertaken ‘costly and 
burdensome measures’ to protect the confidentiality of sensitive communications.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 60 Id. at 402 (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expend-
itures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”). 
 61 Id. at 422, 431, 441 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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B. The Wave of Backlash Comes Crashing Down 
While much of the USA PATRIOT Act has received heavy criti-
cism,62 section 215—pertaining to the acquisition of business records—
has been particularly controversial.63 The constitutional right to privacy, 
specifically under the Fourth Amendment, considers whether an individ-
ual has a reasonable expectation to privacy; the reasonableness decreases 
as the individual moves farther away from the home.64 The third-party 
doctrine—the principle that there is no reasonable expectation to privacy 
when one voluntarily provides information to a third party—bolsters the 
argument that seizing third-party documents does not violate any individ-
ual’s right to privacy.65 Supreme Court jurisprudence on the legality of 
bulk data collection, while considerate of the role technology plays in pri-
vacy, “does not provide a clear legal standard for when the Fourth 
Amendment applies to data shared with a third party . . . .”66 
The combination of a sprawling data landscape, with underdevel-
oped legislative protection and minimal judicial oversight,67 has allowed 
for the NSA’s “dragnet surveillance of the domestic communications” 
that have connections to overseas terrorist activity.68 A New York Times 
article from 2005 brought attention to the Terrorist Surveillance Pro-
gram’s “captur[ing] what are purely domestic communications in some 
cases, despite a requirement . . . that one end of the intercepted conversa-
tions take place on foreign soil . . . .”69 In 2013, Edward Snowden 
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leaked70 a court order directed at Verizon that exposed how extensive the 
NSA’s surveillance program was.71 PRISM was exposed as being an NSA 
and FBI tool used to grab data directly from private online service pro-
viders, like “Microsoft, Google, Apple, Yahoo, and others.”72 
Under the FISA Amendments Act, provisions like section 70273 en-
abled backdoor programs like PRISM to exist for the purpose of collect-
ing e-mails, phone data, and other telecommunications for foreign intelli-
gence.74 Acting under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the NSA 
“collected the telephone records from millions of Verizon customers,” ac-
cording to one of the revelations from the Snowden leaks.75 The Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an independent government agency, 
was enacted to analyze the executive branch’s anti-terrorism decisions 
and ensure the consideration of individual liberties in those decisions.76 
In a 2014 review, the Board found the telephone surveillance programs 
provided no direct contribution “to the discovery of a previously unknown 
terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.”77 
In 2015, responding to the backlash, Congress passed—and Presi-
dent Obama signed—the Uniting and Strengthening America by Ful-
filling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act 
 
 70 While the Snowden leaks were not the first to expose the government’s domestic spy-
ing, his revelations were the culmination of outdated privacy laws combined with the in-
creased technological capabilities of government spying. See John Cassidy, Snowden’s Leg-
acy: A Public Debate About Online Privacy, NEW YORKER (Aug. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc 
/53J2-BAE6. 
 71 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Custom-
ers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), https://perma.cc/G6DC-4RCR (describing an 
order from the NSA requiring Verizon to provide the agency with information on all telephone 
calls in Verizon’s systems on an “ongoing, daily basis.”). 
 72 Sottek & Kopfstein, supra note 51. 
 73 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436. 
 74 See Decoding 702: What Is Section 702?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://perma.cc/9KHX-DKLV (last visited Sept. 19, 2020); see also ‘Incidental,’ Not Acci-
dental, Collection, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/PY9G-ZBVH (last visited Dec. 
14, 2020). 
 75 Greenwald, supra note 71; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2012 
THROUGH 2014 (2016), https://perma.cc/39BW-8BQ6; Paul Szoldra, This Is Everything Ed-
ward Snowden Revealed in One Year of Unprecedented Top-Secret Leaks, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 
16, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/HGP4-XRAX. 
 76 History and Mission, PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., https://perma.cc/6C 
NU-NWBV (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). 
 77 DAVID MEDINE ET AL., PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE 
TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 11 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/S4ET-TLGF. 
46 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:35 
(“USA FREEDOM Act” or “Freedom Act”).78 After some of the USA 
PATRIOT Act’s more controversial provisions (e.g., section 215) had 
sunsetted, the Freedom Act brought them back with narrower require-
ments for the NSA to follow.79 For instance, under the Freedom Act, the 
government must obtain permission from FISC before requesting com-
munications records; additionally, the government cannot engage in bulk 
data grabs and is instead limited to specific search requests.80 The Free-
dom Act also reined in the National Security Letters provision, essentially 
giving it the same restrictions that section 215 received.81 In practice, 
though, these restrictions did not significantly affect the government’s 
abilities to request bulk metadata.82 And under the Freedom Act, these 
provisions were set to expire in December 2019; however, they have been 
reauthorized as recently as March 2020.83 In fact, the latest decision to 
allow these provisions to stay intact came during the beginning of the 
COVID-19 lockdowns in the United States, on March 16, 2020.84 
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE DURING 
COVID-19 
The United States got its first confirmed case of the novel corona-
virus on January 21, 2020.85 On February 26, the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) identified the first U.S. case of COVID-19 
where the patient had neither traveled to an outbreak area nor had a history 
of contact with an infected person.86 While west coast states (e.g., Wash-
ington, California) were the first to attract national attention, it quickly 
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shifted to New York, the epicenter of the U.S. outbreak.87 This attention-
shifting moved to the southern and midwestern United States as different 
states enacted varying levels of re-openings.88 Former President Donald 
Trump declared a national emergency on March 13, 2020.89 Not long af-
ter, the federal government sought broader powers during this state of 
emergency. For instance, only eight days after then-President Trump’s 
emergency declaration, the Department of Justice requested the ability to 
“detain people indefinitely without trial during emergencies.”90 
A. Background on the Data Changes Since 9/11 
Before delving into COVID-19 data surveillance, it is important to 
establish the data scene that currently exists, as compared to what existed 
post-9/11. The kind of technology that existed immediately following 
9/11 was generally limited.91 The percentage of U.S. adults who own cell 
phones has jumped from 62% in 2002 to 96% in 2019.92 Smartphones, 
which actively and passively connect to the internet, have vastly increased 
the volume of data—specifically location data—on individual users.93 
Legislation for electronic communications has existed since the 
1980s but does not meet the needs of our present data-scape. Section 
2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act, a law governing the volun-
tary and compelled disclosure of electronic communications held by 
third-party service providers, requires only that non-content information 
be “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”—a lower 
standard than a warrant requires—to compel production.94 Jurisprudence 
has been underdeveloped as well. It was not until 2018, in Carpenter v. 
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United States, that the Supreme Court held a warrant was required to ob-
tain aggregated cell-site location information (CSLI) from a third party 
during a criminal investigation.95  
With shockingly little privacy precedent regarding aggregated cell 
phone location metadata combined with an unprecedented global health 
crisis, it is hard to predict the boundaries of future surveillance policy. 
Relaxed privacy standards that exist generally for third-party data collec-
tion compounded with a national crisis, where third-party data collection 
is necessary to stem the crisis, lead to the conclusion that those standards 
will only be further relaxed.96 
Public health surveillance also uses big data, a practice that had been 
going on prior to the pandemic.97 Among the goals of public health sur-
veillance are “outbreak investigation, identifying newborns who need es-
sential medical care, and research.”98 As heart disease and cancer started 
killing more people in the U.S. than infectious diseases, public health sur-
veillance expanded beyond preventing infectious diseases and began 
identifying factors that cause chronic illnesses.99 Public health surveil-
lance now looks deeper into an individual’s medical history to find ge-
netic, behavioral, and environmental factors that could lead to chronic ill-
ness, rather than looking at surface symptoms connected to infectious 
diseases.100 This bears likeness to the NSA’s data collecting methodolo-
gies, as it also sweeps up large swathes of information.101 
B. What Does Surveillance During the COVID-19 Pandemic Look Like? 
Akin to how the NSA was central to anti-terrorism surveillance, the 
current pandemic requires the involvement of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) for data collection. The CDC, an 
agency within HHS, has stressed the importance of surveillance—cou-
pled with shelter-in-place policies—to control and limit the spread of 
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COVID-19.102 History, too, holds examples of disease surveillance meth-
ods—albeit rudimentary ones—during pandemics. During the 1918 Span-
ish flu pandemic, white scarves tied on doors were used to identify which 
houses had people with infections;103 and in 1854, John Snow’s cholera 
map tracked the disease’s progress, laying the groundwork for how we do 
the same today.104 Though technology has changed, epidemiological sur-
veillance (i.e., “the systematic collection, analysis, interpretation and 
timely dissemination of health data for the planning, implementation and 
evaluation of public health program[s]”)105 remains critically important to 
containing a disease.106 
The post-9/11 era also utilized public health surveillance out of fear 
that a second wave of bioterrorist activity might occur.107 Deaths resulting 
from anthrax mailed in letters108—as well as avian influenza109 and the 
SARS epidemic110 that soon followed—created anxiety that fueled the 
CDC’s drafting of model legislation for mandatory disease reporting (e.g., 
the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act).111 The CDC also pro-
posed an increase in funding for federal bioterrorism grants to create sur-
veillance programs.112 Collection methods generally included case-re-
porting, population surveys, medical records reviews, and 
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epidemiological research.113 While public health surveillance for pur-
poses of national security is not a new concept, it will utilize the third-
party, private internet industry in a unique way.114 
Like the NSA did through its surveillance programs, the government 
is contracting with third-party software companies to do the tracing.115 
Contracting with private, third-party internet service providers allows for 
lower government regulation.116 It also means the type of data being 
sought is considered “business records” (much like the post-9/11 surveil-
lance era),117 which provides greater ease of access to government offi-
cials.118 
Before Google and Apple’s contract to create contact tracing tech-
nology, Google’s sister company, Verily, and its Project Baseline were 
touted by then-President Trump as a “front line player in the fight against 
a global pandemic.”119 The Baseline COVID-19 Program was developed 
“under the direction of the California Department of Public Health.”120 At 
the outset, users create a profile, take an online screener, and, if eligible, 
are directed to a testing site.121 The Project Baseline website makes no 
mention of temporality when it discusses the storage of users’ health data; 
but it acknowledges that a range of information provided by users (e.g., 
name, address, phone number, survey responses) may be disseminated to 
“third parties” (e.g., contractors, public health authorities, Google) and 
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that Google’s access to user data will be “limited to the purpose of provid-
ing [protective storage] services.”122 Soon after Verily launched, it had 
issues with reaching site capacity,123 preventing users from scheduling 
testing appointments.124 The survey Verily used also behaved unexpect-
edly after users responded to a question about whether they were experi-
encing symptoms and “caused confusion among people trying to use the 
site.”125 Furthermore, Verily required that its users create a Google profile 
before using its site, which added to the insecurity over privacy protec-
tions for user health data.126 These issues, resulting from a website created 
in a rush to meet the promises made by former President Trump, made it 
“more clear than ever that the website Trump described is not what the 
American public will use to find coronavirus testing.”127 
Like the way the government compelled and contracted with private 
entities like Verizon and AT&T for surveillance under the USA 
PATRIOT Act,128 the government is now contracting with software cor-
porations, like Google, Apple, and Facebook.129 Google and Apple made 
smartphone technology that relies on the voluntary input of a positive 
COVID-19 diagnosis.130 The tech uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) 
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transmissions to track user proximities without tracking their specific lo-
cation in the way GPS data does.131 In short, the technology: 
[P]ick[s] up the signals of nearby phones at 5-minute intervals and 
store[s] the connections between them in a database. If one person 
tests positive for the novel coronavirus, they could tell the app 
they’ve been infected, and it could notify other people whose 
phones passed within close range in the preceding days.132 
The tech, released in May 2020, already has buy-in: “[Twenty-two] 
countries and several US states are already planning to build voluntary 
phone apps using their software.”133 Facebook has also rolled out an in-
teractive COVID-19 map to show how many people have reported symp-
toms in one’s county.134 Facebook’s data comes from a survey of over 
one million users that was conducted by Carnegie Mellon University re-
searchers.135 
Other countries have versions of these apps with varying pipelines 
to their respective governments. In China’s fight against the disease’s sec-
ond wave, its government began tracking citizens by sorting their personal 
data “into color-coded categories . . . corresponding to their health . . . .”136 
In Singapore, the Trace Together app keeps a register of all individual 
users’ contacts and informs any contact who has been in proximity of that 
user within two weeks if that user tests positive for COVID-19.137 Israel 
is also directly tracking location data on citizens’ cell phones.138 
C. Emerging Criticisms 
Ultimately, contact tracing may prove to be an untrustworthy form 
of metadata surveillance. The kind of BLE technology the apps use to 
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conduct contact tracing has not proven reliable.139 Nuances of contact will 
be lost—likely increasing false positives—because tracing proximity 
through Bluetooth does not consider factors like duration (i.e., how long 
people are in contact with one another) or spatial considerations besides 
distance (i.e., whether users are in different rooms but still close enough 
for their phones to register each other’s location).140 The apps also require 
voluntary compliance, which makes their potential for accuracy unrelia-
ble.141 
Policies regulating health-data privacy also create issues of consent. 
HHS’s first response to COVID-19 was to adjust its regulations under the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to accom-
modate surveillance programs.142 The Clinton administration enacted 
HIPAA to regulate insurance coverage,143 reduce healthcare fraud and 
abuse,144 and mandate confidentiality for protected healthcare data,145 
among other things. Customarily, a patient’s written authorization is re-
quired for Public Health Information (PHI) to be disclosed by a covered 
entity, except when disclosure is required in narrow circumstances.146 
Alex Azar, the former Secretary of HHS, relaxed certain privacy provi-
sions under HIPAA.147 For instance, patient consent is no longer required 
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in certain circumstances if the release of that information is necessary.148 
What is considered “necessary”—much like what was considered “sig-
nificant” under the USA PATRIOT Act—can be subject to broad inter-
pretation.149 
Republican Senators Roger Wicker (MS), John Thune (SD), Deb 
Fischer (NE), Jerry Moran (KS), and Marsha Blackburn (TN), introduced 
the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act (CCDPA) on May 7, 
2020.150 The bill’s goal is to “regulate the data collected by coronavirus 
contact tracing apps,”151 and it claims to give users agency over how their 
data will be collected and disseminated, like requesting the user’s “affirm-
ative express consent.”152 Other bill provisions would allow users to opt 
out of data collection, revoke their consent, and anonymize the data once 
the pandemic is over, along with other cybersecurity protection man-
dates.153 
The bill, however, will likely be ineffective. For starters, the data 
anonymization provision covers only data that was collected for the pur-
pose of coronavirus contact tracing and not other data swept up in the 
collection process.154 The bill also bypasses other stronger privacy pro-
tections provided by the FCC and prevents states from enacting their own 
“stricter privacy protections in the absence of strong federal protections 
at the FTC.”155 Most egregiously, CCDPA does not provide a private right 
of action156 for injured parties.157 
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Ten days after the CCDPA was introduced, Democratic Senators 
Richard Blumenthal (CT) and Mark Warner (VA), with Democratic Rep-
resentatives Anna Eshoo (CA-18), Jan Schakowsky (IL-9), and Suzan 
DelBene (WA-1), introduced their own privacy bill, titled the Public 
Health Emergency Privacy Act (PHEPA).158 PHEPA is considered more 
substantial regarding individual privacy protections than its Republican 
counterpart: “It requires opt-in consent and data minimization, and limits 
data disclosures to government. It has a strong private right of action and 
does not preempt state laws. And it bars denial of voting rights to people 
who decline to opt-in to tracking programs.”159 Even with these privacy 
protections championed by privacy experts, there are still weaknesses, in-
cluding “broad exemptions for manual contact tracing, public health re-
search, public health authorities, and entities regulated by [HIPAA].”160 
It also opens the door for potential discrimination—in areas like employ-
ment and education—should people decline to use tracking apps.161 
Finally, a third bill, the Exposure Notification Privacy Act (ENPA), 
was introduced on June 1, 2020, by Senators Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and 
Bill Cassidy (R-LA).162 This bill specifically targets data collected from 
“automated exposure notification service[s],” including contact tracing 
apps.163 ENPA, like PHEPA, has a broad definition of the types of data it 
would protect,164 but, like the CCPDA, it has a limited scope for a covered 
entity.165 While narrowly confined to contact tracing apps, the scope of 
ENPA’s application is not limited to the pandemic,166 a positive sign 
when considering long-term privacy protections. 
It is worth noting that not all the privacy legislation being passed 
during the pandemic is necessarily related to the pandemic. While the in-
tent behind the above bills may seem to favor individual privacy rights, 
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the Senate negated this gesture by attempting to renew the USA 
PATRIOT Act.167 Soon after the renewal bill’s announcement, then-Sen-
ate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell moved to amend the USA 
PATRIOT Act and allow the FBI to collect data on “Americans’ web-
browsing and search histories without a warrant.”168 While this amend-
ment is not directly part of any COVID-19 public health surveillance pro-
grams, it clearly follows the post-9/11 pattern of taking advantage of a 
national crisis to strengthen the government’s reach into the privacy 
sphere. 
III: WHAT KINDS OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES WILL REDUCE THE 
POTENTIAL FOR PRIVACY VIOLATIONS? 
The similarities between post-9/11 and COVID-19 surveillance were 
noticed almost immediately by the privacy community.169 Once again, the 
government will use data collected from private, third-party corporations, 
and the laws governing individual users’ privacy rights will not provide 
much protection. While these kinds of broad-sweeping, data-grabbing 
programs are a threat to any person, they disproportionately affect vulner-
able communities in practice. Anti-Muslim ideology heavily influenced 
determinations of who became a target of NSA terrorist surveillance post-
9/11.170 And throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Asian-American com-
munities, specifically Chinese-American communities, have been sub-
jected to varying acts of racism, including hate crimes.171 
Racism in data surveillance is inevitable, as non-white communities 
maintain higher rates of infections and deaths from COVID-19.172 Black 
Americans and other communities of color are already subject to much 
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higher rates of surveillance through local policing173 and federal agencies 
like the FBI and NSA.174 This kind of surveillance has gone hand-in-hand 
with justifying state-sanctioned violence and other aggressive control tac-
tics against Black and Brown communities.175 And it has already mani-
fested during the COVID-19 pandemic: At the beginning of New York 
City’s quarantine, there were disturbing differences in how the NYPD en-
forced social distancing on Black and Hispanic communities compared to 
white communities.176 
Contact tracing policy must consider who will benefit from contact 
tracing and health data surveillance, given institutionalized medical rac-
ism and the general health disparities that racism creates for Black and 
Brown people overall.177 Houseless people who cannot afford data plans, 
a severely at-risk population, will not have adequate access to contact 
tracing technology.178 People in living conditions incompatible with dig-
ital contact tracing, like migrant workers sharing one mobile device or 
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people in refugee camps experiencing unstable internet or internet black-
outs, will not see the benefits of contact tracing technology.179 If this tech-
nology is not able to assist people in high-risk communities, the dangers 
of broad surveillance do not justify the benefits.180 It is vital to implement 
privacy protections to reduce the harm that, based on previous examples, 
will befall the most vulnerable. 
Those who have made the comparison between 9/11 and COVID-19 
have provided insight on applying the lessons we learned, post-9/11, to 
the current moment.181 Key pieces of advice, gleaned from the literature 
then and now, include enforcing temporality (either in the surveillance 
laws or in the ways that data can be stored),182 creating effective structures 
of oversight to enforce limitations on surveillance programs,183 and 
providing full transparency to the individual whose data is being collected 
and disseminated so they know where that data is going and how it will 
be used.184 
Congress has acted quickly to respond to COVID-19, as it did im-
mediately after 9/11. As mentioned in Part II, CCDPA, PHEPA, and 
ENPA are three pieces of legislation, drafted shortly after the U.S. began 
its pandemic response, that address contact tracing privacy concerns.185 
Although PHEPA and ENPA contain promising aspects, rushed legisla-
tion made during a crisis requires “focused and balanced” updates as the 
crisis continues.186 The USA PATRIOT Act had several provisions (e.g., 
Section 215) that sunsetted in May 2015.187 Even though this section was 
essentially renewed via the Freedom Act with (allegedly) stricter limita-
tions, the original provision was created with a sense of temporality.188 
Including provisions that sunset provides an avenue for more “thoughtful 
debate” afterwards189 or even an end to the intrusive, once-needed data 
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policy altogether. The data are purportedly collected anonymously,190 
though truly anonymous data has little value,191 especially when tracing 
the spread of disease through a population.192 In fact, Android users are 
required to turn on their device location setting, enabling GPS, to use the 
contact tracing apps on their phone; this, perhaps obviously, causes trep-
idation in believing the software is “privacy preserving.”193 Even without 
GPS data, the aggregate of enough data points can identify a user, so the 
data should only be stored temporarily.194 
There should be significant, external oversight—akin to the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s oversight of the NSA—to ensure 
the collected data has been useful in preventing the spread of COVID-19. 
If the data has not proven useful, appropriate enforcement will be required 
to prevent the unnecessary collection of data. Contact tracing through 
BLE technology may also prove to be unreliable.195 External bodies like 
the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, House Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
and FISC have the authority to investigate the NSA.196 Protections under 
the Office for Human Research ensure that HHS complies with the law.197 
HHS can also be internally inspected by the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral.198 These investigatory bodies should be regularly involved to make 
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sure health data is being used correctly to prevent the spread of COVID-
19 and not continuously collected when it serves no purpose. There could 
also be an investigatory commission (not like the Trump administration’s 
coronavirus taskforce),199 that retains regulatory authority to track and 
evaluate the government’s response to COVID-19 as the pandemic con-
tinues in the future.200 
When asking people to comply with contact tracing apps, it is imper-
ative that there be full transparency as to where their information is go-
ing.201 The revelations about the NSA’s surveillance activities, like what 
Edward Snowden leaked or the decades of other surveillance projects,202 
have sowed Americans’ distrust in state agencies.203 The justification for 
keeping these programs secret, post-9/11, was to keep the intelligence out 
of enemy hands.204 This justification, however, does not support govern-
ment secrecy when invading individual privacy, as “[h]alf of Americans 
say they are not at all or not too confident that the federal government will 
keep their personal records safe from hackers or unauthorized users.”205 
The Facebook surveys conducted by Carnegie Mellon researchers used 
for tracking are eerily reminiscent of the Cambridge Analytica surveys 
that manipulated users leading up to the 2016 presidential election and 
other elections globally.206 These surveys could cause users to do a dou-
ble-take, afraid that their responses will be sold by opportunistic third par-
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ties (e.g., Facebook) for their own financial gain. Full government trans-
parency (especially when contracting with corporate third parties) will 
encourage user engagement and increase the potential for success. While 
HHS has relaxed HIPAA-related consent standards for covered entities 
when distributing PHI to Public Health Authorities (and in some instances 
to the media, family, and friends),207 user-provided consent must be con-
sidered integral to the COVID-19 contact tracing apps.208 
CONCLUSION 
It is expected that an emergency situation will require a quick re-
sponse, but sometimes that results in responses that are not appropriate 
for the emergency.209 Surveillance will be an integral part of containing 
the coronavirus, but a common occurrence during national crises is for 
the executive branch to take advantage of the moment to create new and 
bold powers for the government, with little oversight.210 This overstep 
was evident after 9/11, when the NSA intercepted communications and 
gathered metadata from millions of American consumers through third-
party telephone and internet providers.211 Many of those policies are still 
in place; and even though they were amended some,212 there are still huge 
chasms for individual privacy rights to fall into.213 Looking back at the 
policy decisions from the Bush administration—and the fallout from 
those decisions—will help create a safer legal space for the individual as 
the government attempts to create a safer physical space during the pan-
demic. 
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